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PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE






staticmonopolies, namelymonopoliessellingnon-durablegoods. At thesametime, thespatial
approachasbeenwidelyusedinapplicationstothechoiceofproductdesign. Inaspatial
context, hequestionis if monopolypowerleadstotheplantlocationwhichminimizestransport






















valuationforthegood. Thisisknowntobeharmfultothemonopolist, andI shallrefertothis














































Define footnote anetworkN asasubsetof©2, whereN istheunionofafinitenumberof
arcs, ofawelldefinedlength. EacharcinN intersectsatleastoneandatmostwootherarcsin
N. Arcscanintersecteachotheronlyattheirextremities. Thesetofvertices, V , ofthenetworkis
madeoftheextremitiesofthearcs. SdenotesasubsetofV withtypicalelementsi, for
i = 1,...,m. At eachpointsi 5 S—andonlyatsuchpoints—isassociatedanumberpi (in©+)
andafunctionDiÝpiÞ from©+ toitself. ConsidertheproblemknownastheWeber





wheret isapositiveconstant, hepiD ’saregiven, anddÝs,siÞ isthedistance(tobedefined
shortly) betweentwopoints, sandsi belongingtoanetwork. Thedistancebetweentwopointsis
definedasthelengthoftheshortestrouteonN, linkingthetwopoints.
A resultduetoHakimi(1964), simplifiesthesearchforasolutiontotheWeberproblem:
Theorem(Hakimi,1964): Thepoints 5 N, whichminimizesTÝsÞ, belongstoV.
TheWeberproblem, interpretedinaneconomicset-up, amountstotheminimizationoftotal
transportcostsincurredfortransferringquantitiesofanoutput footnote toanumberofmarkets
(thepoints i inS) locatedonanetworkN, forgivenpricespiD ateachdestinationi S. Total
transportcostoneachnodetdÝs,siÞ ismadeupoftheper-unittransportcostmultipliedbythe
quantitydemandedattheprevailingpricepiD. Fromthepointofviewofspatialeconomicsthisis
clearlyarelevantproblem, andtheHakimitheoremausefulresult. However, theHakimi
theoremleadstootherinterestingcorollariesfromaneconomicviewpoint. It canbeeasilyseen
infactthatamonopolistwhoisallowedtopracticespatialpricediscriminationa dquoting
deliveredpricesoneachmarketnodesi, will choosethesamelocationsD whichminimizing
transportcostsisalsosociallyoptimal. In fact, consideramonopolistwhoproducesatcosts

























§ < 1. MarketnodeA is locatedatend-point0andnodeB atendpoint§ (inthenotationof
Section2, sA = 0andsB = §). ThecostofcarryingoneunitofthegoodoverthedistancedÝs,siÞ
isequalto Ýs? siÞ2 , fori = A,B.
Thedemandfunctionineachmarketisadiscontinuousfunction, asit shallbeclearfromthe
descriptionbelow. InmarketnodeA thereare”highvaluation” consumers, i.e. thosewith
valuationofthegoodgivenbyv, withvdistributedovertheintervalß1,1.5à accordingtothe
uniformfunctionFÝvÞ = v? 1
Ý0.5Þ
. Inadditiontothesebuyers, atmarketnodeA thereisamassx
oflowvaluationbuyers, whovaluethegoodatv0, withv0 < 1. Assumealso





u = Nt?1Ýv? piÞ for t = 1,2; and i = A,B.   #   
Differentmarketsdiscountthefutureatthesamerate, N, asthemonopolist. Assumefurtherthat
A.2. v0Ýx+ AÞ < A.
Thelocationchosenbythemonopolistisdenotedbys, withs 5 ß0,§à. Letdefinethestatic
demandandprofitasthosewhichapplywhenthereisnosecondperiod(or, whichisequivalent,
whenthemonopolistcancommitoaconstantpriceoverthetwoperiods).
Definition ThestaticmonopolydemandonnodeA isDÝpÞ = mináA,2ßÝ3/2Þ ? pàAâ for
v0 < p < 3/2, DÝpÞ = A + x forv0 ³ p, andDÝpÞ = 0otherwise. Thestaticmonopoly
profitonnodeA whens=0ispADAÝpAÞ ¯ #^ A.
Thereasonfordisregardingthestaticprofitforlocationsdifferentfroms = 0isthathe
profit^# A issufficientasareferencepoint, asit shallbecomeapparentinthesequel.
Assumption(A.2) impliesthathestaticprofitmadebythemonopolistonnodeA is largerif
hesellsatprice1onlytothehightypesratherthansellingtoeverybodyatpricev0. Furthermore,
it iseasytoseethathepricewhichmaximizesthefunctionpßÝ3/2Þ ? pà2A is lowerthan1(in
particularit isequalto3/4) sothatp1D = 1isthepricewhichmaximizesthestaticlocalprofiton
A. ThisisthewayinwhichtheCoaseargumentshowsupinthepresentexample; themonopolist
locatedats = 0wouldliketocommitoapricesequencep1A = p2A = 1andrealizethestatic









Obviously, thestaticdemandinB isrectangularwithDÝpÞ = B if p ² 1andDÝpÞ = 0
otherwise. Clearly, pD = 1isthestaticoptimaldeliveredpriceonmarketB if themonopolist
locatesinB. Thereisno”Coaseproblem” onnodeB inthisexample.
TodeveloptheargumentleadingtotheresultI shallanalyzefirstthepricesequencefor
locations = 0, thenthepricesequenceforlocations0 < s < v0, andfinallythatfors ³ v0. The
maximumprofitassociatedtoeachlocationchoiceiscomputedateachstepandthena
comparisonwill showthatundersomeconditionsontheparametersthebestlocationisoneto
therightofv0 (infactit is justatrifletotherightofv0Þ.
1. ConsiderthepricingproblemofthemonopolistlocatedatpointsA = 0. Clearly, if p1 > v0
themonopolisthasanincentivetosellatthesecondperiodtoconsumerswhohavenotboughtin
thefirstperiod, atapricewhichshallbelowerthanthefirstperiodprice. Then, sinceconsumers
canwait, theconsumervofnodeA atthefirstperiodbuysonlyif thepricep1A issuchthat
v? p1A ³ NÝv? p2AÞ.
Sothatgivenp1A > v0, onlythetypeswithvaluationlargerthanv* ¯
p1A ? Np" 2A
Ý1? NÞ
shallbuyatthe
firstperiod, wherep" 2A isthesecondperiodpriceanticipatedbythebuyers.
Toproceed, firstitmustbeshownthatp2A cannotbesethigherthan1alongatimeconsistent
pricepath, andthenitshallbeeasytopindowntheequilibriumpricesequencefors = 0. Since
thesecondperioddemand, forp2A > 1, isthemeasureofbuyerswithvaluationsintheinterval
ßp2A,v*à, thenit isgivenby2AÝv* ? p2AÞ . Therefore, tohavep2A ³ 1p2A mustbethesolutionto
max
p2
2AÝv* ? p2ÞÝp2 ? sÞ.   #   
Sincefors = 0, thispriceis lowerthan1, asshownintheproofofthefollowingLemma, it is
possibletostate:
Lemma If s = 0, theonlypricesequenceÝp1A,p2AÞ whichistimeconsistentiswith
p1A = Ý1? NÞv0 + Nv0 andp2A = v0.
Proof.
(a) p2A ³ 1cannotbepartofatimeconsistentpricepath. Indeed, assumep2 ³ 1. p2 > p1
cannotbeatimeconsistentpricesequence. If p2 < p1 onlyconsumerswithvaluationhigherthan
v* ¯ p1 ? Np2
Ý1? NÞ




2A p1 ? p2
1? N p2 =
p1
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4? 3N .   #   
Thisvalueofp1 is lowerthan1forallvaluesofN 5 ß0,1à, butthiscontradictshathesecond
perioddemandbemadeofhighvaluationtypeswithp2A > 1.
(b) 1 ³ p2 > v0 cannotbepartofatimeconsistentpricepath. Indeed, sincedemandinA is
totallyinelasticovertherangeofpricesÝv0,1à, theneitherit isp2 = 1, whichcontradictspart(a)
above, orp2 ² v0.
(c) SincedemandisequaltoA + x forallpriceslowerthanv0, thentheonlysecondperiodprice
whichcanbepartofatimeconsistentpricepathisp2A = v0. It followsthatfirstperioddemand,
D1AÝp1A,v0Þ, forp1 intherangeß1,3/2à shallbegivenbyD1AÝp1A,v0Þ =
min A 3? 2Ýp1 ? Nv0Þ
Ý1? NÞ
, A . Thefunction,







1(giventhatv0 < §/2and§ < 1Þ. Butthenthebestfirstperiodpriceisthepricewhichmakesthe
buyerwithwillingnesstopayexactlyequalto1indifferentbetweenbuyingsoonorwaitingfor
p2 = v0. Thispriceisthesolutionto1? p1 = NÝ1? v0Þ andit indeedcorrespondsto
p1 = Ý1? NÞ + Nv0, which, givenv0 < §/2 < 1, liesasrequiredintheinterval
Ýv0,1Þ. [End Proof] 
Thehighestprofitthathemonopolistcanmakeif helocatesins = 0istherefore, theone
correspondingtodeliveredpricesp1B = p2B = 1, andp1A = Ý1? NÞ + Nv0, p2A = v0.
Totalprofitsfors = 0are
^Ý0Þ ¯ AßÝ1? NÞ + Nv0à + Nv0x+ B ? §B.   #   
2. Considernowanylocationintheintervalß0,v0Þ. SincetheunittransportcosttomarketA
is lessthanv0 themonopolistcannotcommitorefusetoselltocustomerswithvaluationv0 at
thesecondperiod. Ontheotherhand, asecondperiodpricesuchthatv0 < p2 ² 1isnottime
consistentgiventhatdemandonnodeA istotallyinelasticoverthatrangeofprices.















Ýp1 ? sÞ2 .   #   
Onecanfindthathesolutionto( ref: MS ) is
p1A =
3Ý1? NÞ + sÝ2? 3NÞ
4? 3N ,   #   
which, again, is lowerthan1forallvaluesofN. Butthiscontradictshatp2 > 1. In thiscasealso,
theonlytimeconsistentpricesequenceisp2A = v0 andp1A = Ý1? NÞ + Nv0. Thepricesarethe
sameasforthelocations = 0, buttransportcostsarepositive, thereforeprofitsonA arelower.
Totalprofitsfors 5 Ý0,v0Þ are
AßÝ1? NÞ + Nv0 ? sà + NÝv0 ? sÞx+ B ? Ý§ ? sÞB.   #   
3. Considerlocations > v0. At thesecondperiodit is impossibletoservethelowvaluation
consumerswithoutincurringalosssincetheunittransportcostfromsto0is largerthanthe
reservationpricev0. Thenit iscredibletorefusesellingtolowvaluationcustomersby
maintainingp2A = 1. Thepricesequencep1A = p2A = 1is indeedtimeconsistent.
Totalprofitsfromlocations > v0 are
AÝ1? sÞ + B ? Ý§ ? sÞB.   #   
4. A comparisoncannowbemade. Thediscussionsofarimpliesthatanylocationinthe
interval0 < s ² v0, implies, asarguedabove, thathesecondperiodpricebelowenoughto
servethelowvaluationbuyersinnodeA. Then, theprofitfromtheselocationsi easilyseento
belowerthanprofit^ Ý0Þ inequation( ref: P0 ). It issufficientthentocompare( ref: PSS ) with
( ref: P0 ). It is immediateosee, thatalocations > v0 dominatess = 0if
? sÝA ? BÞ + NA ? Nv0ÝA + xÞ ³ 0.   #   
RemarkthatheL.H.S. inthisinequalityis increasinginN : Theimportanceattributedtothe
futuremakescommitmentmorevaluable. ForanyvalueofN, furthermore, thisinequalitystrictly
holdsforA = B, underassumption(A.2). Themonopolistthereforeshalllocateatapointv0 + O ,
wheneverA = B, butalsowhenA issmallerthanB andcondition( ref: C ) holds. Profitsfrom
locatingclosetov0 are(neglectingO)
AÝ1? v0Þ + B ? Ý§ ? v0ÞB.   #   
Totalsalesbythemonopolistlocatedatv0 + O areA + B. Bycontrastthesociallyoptimal
location, givensalesA + B iss = 0if A > B ands = § if B > A, forallvaluesofN. HereN may
playacrucialroleindirectingthemonopolistchoice, whileitplaysnoroleinthedecisionabout
whichisthesociallyoptimallocation.
PropositionIf inequality( ref: C ) holds, thelocationchoiceofadurablegoodsmonopolistissocially
inefficient.
Also,














atbothnodes, withFÝvÞ = vJ atnodeA, andFÝvÞ = vK onnodeB, whereJ andK are
nonnegativescalars. Thenitcanbeseenthathesecondperioddemandisgivenoneachnodeby
themeasureofthebuyerswithvaluationcomprisedintheintervalßv*,p2i à fori = A,B. The
measureofthisquantityisv* J ? Ýp2AÞJ onmarketA andv*K ? Ýp2BÞK onmarketB. Similarly, first
perioddemandonnodeA (resp. B) isthequantity1? v* J (resp. 1? v*K).
Letp2AÝp1A,sÞ , (resp. p2BÝp1B,sÞ ) denotethesecondperiodpricewhichsolvestheproblem
max
p
Ýp? sÞÝv* J ? pJÞ,











Define^ 1A = Ýp1A ? sÞÝ1? ÝvAÞJÞ, and^ 2A = ßp2AÝp1A,sÞÞ ? sàßÝvAÞJ ? Ýp2AÝp1A,sÞÞJà, thentotal
intertemporalprofitsonnodeA, (resp. B) discountedatperiod1are
^A = ^1
A + N^2
A,   #   
andrespectively, letting^ 1B = ßp1B ? Ý§ ? sÞàß1? ÝvBÞKà and
^2




Thechoiceofp1A (resp. p1B) ismadesoastomaximizeprofitsonbothnodesforanylocation
s. Thismaximizationaffordsamaximumdenotedby
E = EA + EB = E1
A + E1
B + NÝE2A + E2BÞ.Usingtheenvelopetheoremandthenotation
viv =
/viÝpi,sÞ













/s ? 1 ßvA
J ? Ýp2AÞJà + Ýp2A ? sÞJ vAJ?1vAv ? Ýp2AÞJ?1
/p2A
/s .   #   
As thenotationsuggests, ( ref: pia1 ) and( ref: pia2 ) arethederivativesofthefirstand
secondperiodcomponentsofthesumofdiscountedprofitsrespectively.
AsEA1v + NEA2v isthederivativeofprofitsonnodeA soEB1v + NEB1v isthetotal
derivative footnote ofthesumofdiscountedprofitsonnodeB. Thetotalderivativeofprofitsis
ofcourseEA1v + EB1v + NÝEA2v + EB2v Þ.
Onecannotethatinthetotalderivativearepresentfour”quantitycomponents” thesearethe
terms?Ý1? vAJÞ and?NÝvAJ ? Ýp2AÞJÞ fornodeA, andÝ1? vB
KÞ andNÝvB
K ? Ýp2BÞKÞ fornodeB.
Besidesthese”quantitycomponents” thereappearothertermsreflectingthepropertythatby
changingthesecondperiodpricethevaluesforvA andvB, whichenterthedemandfunctionat

























TÝs,NÞ = sÝ1? vAJÞ + sNßvAJ ? Ýp2AÞJà + Ý§ ? sÞ Ý1? vB
KÞ + NßvB
K ? Ýp2BÞKà .
Thefirstderivativewithrespecttosoftheobjectivefunctionis
Ý1? vAJÞ + NßvAJ ? Ýp2AÞJà ? Ý1? vB
KÞ ? NßvB
K ? Ýp2BÞKà.   #   
Clearly, ( ref: foc2 ) onlyinvolvesthe”quantityterms”, whiletheeffectsof locationonthe
consumers’ behavior(thechangesinthevaluesforthevvs) aremissing. Therefore, since







demand: thatis, thepopulationofconsumersinB isformedofidenticalconsumerswhovalue
thegoodatv = 1. Letthemassoftheseconsumersbeequalto1. Furthermore, l tmarketnodeA
bepopulatedbyconsumerswithvaluationin[0,1], andletJ = 1. Thenitcanbeeasilyseenthat
vA = Ýp1 ? Np2Þ/Ý1? NÞ, thepricep2A whichmaximizessecondperiodprofitsis
p2AÝp1AÞ = Ýp1A + sÞ/2. Plugginginthisvalueofp2A intotheprofitfunctionfornodeA
^A = Ýp1A ? sÞÝ1? vAÞ + NÝp2A ? sÞÝvA ? p2AÞ,
andmaximizingwithrespecttop1A, yields
p1A = Ý1+ sÞÝ1? NÞ/2 p2A = Ý1+ sÞÝ1? NÞ/4+ s/2.
Quiteobviously, onnodeB onehasthatp1B = p2B = 1andallconsumerstherebuyatdate1.
Then, lettingpn = Ýp1A ? sÞ =










ÝpnÞ2 + 1? Ý§ ? sÞ.

















customers. TheutilityfrompurchaseofabuyerinnodeA, givenamillpriceatperiodt, pt say,
isequalto
Nt?1Ýv? pt ? sÞ for t = 1,2.   #   
TheutilityforbuyerslocatedatnodeB is
Nt?1ßv? pt ? Ý§ ? sÞà.   #   
Then, theindifferencebetweenwaitingandbuyingsoonobtainsfor




atNodeA, withvaluationv0, makesit impossibleforthemonopolistlocatedats = 0tousea
millpricesequencelikep1 = 1andp2 = 1. As forthecaseofsection3, theincentivetoserve
lowvaluationcustomerscannotbeeliminatedif thesellerlocatesat(orcloseto) s = 0. Again























(1994), seealsoShin, MaiandLin (1988), whileBilas(1969) considersmultipleplantfirms).
Thewelfarecomparisonsintheliteraturegenerallyhingeuponthequantitysoldoneachmarket
oruponthesuppressionfsalesonsomeofthemarkets. Marketseparability(geographicor




onlyconcernthelocationeffectsonwelfare. Note, however, thatinboththeexamples
consideredabove(Section3andSection4) thesuboptimallocationimpliesanincreaseinprices
(loweroutput) withrespecttothosewhichmaximizeprofitswhenthemonopolistissetatthe






underoligopolisticrivalry. A secondissueisthelocationofmultiplant, ormultiproductfirms.
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